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INTRODUCTION
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is
conducting research to provide background research and to develop
the technology to improve the safety and utility of General
Aviation (G.A.) Single Pilot Instrument Flight Rules (SPIFR)
operations. In order to more effectively and efficiently utilize
available resources, operational and problem definition studies
performed by both the NASA and other agencies are being used to
assist in directing the NASA research effort.
The following are recent studies that have investigated the
nature and dimensions of the SPIFR operation and the problems
experienced. 1
RI.
R2.
R3.
Weislogel, G.S.; and Miller, J.M.: Study to Determine
the Operational Profile and Mission of the Certificated
Instrument Rated Private and Commercial Pilot.
Report No. FAA-RD-70-51, 1970.
Forsyth, Donna L.; and Shaughnessy, John D.: Single
Pilot IFR Operating Problems Determined from Accident
Data Analysis. NASA TM-78773, 1978.
Bolz, Eric H.; and Eisele, Janice E.: General Aviation
IFR Operational Problems. NASA Contractor Report 159022,
1979.
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Abbreviations used in this report are found beginning on page
iii. For the readers ease of reference, information that is
extracted from a report and presented in the body or appendices of
this report, may be referred to by report No. (R-_); page number
(p._); paragraph No. (para_) or a combination as appropriate.
R4.
R5.
R6.
R7.
Bergeron, Hugh P.: Analysis of General Aviation Single -
Pilot IFR Incident Data Obtained From the NASA Aviation
Safety Reporting System. NASA TM 80206, 1980.
Weislogel, Stacy: Operational Problems Experienced by
Single Pilots in Instrument Meteorological Conditions.
NASA CR 166236, 1981.
Weislogel, G.S.: Study To Determine the IFR Operational
Profile and Problems of the General Aviation Single
Pilot. NASA CR 3576, 1983.
Harris, D.F.; and Morrisette, J.A.: Single Pilot IFR
Accident Data Analysis. NASA CR-3650, 1982
OBJECTIVE
The objective of this study was to develop an overview
document that summarizes, makes comparisons, identifies key
issues and common findings, and integrates the results of SPIFR
operational problems research found in the seven studies.
METHODOLOGY
The reports were reviewed to determine those aspects of
commonality that could be analyzed and correlated. The sections
of the seven reports that were considered relevant to this study
were the objective, methodology, results, and recommendations.
These data were analyzed and integrated, and are presented in
appendices 1-4. The results were disaggregated into similar
subject areas. (See appendix 5). The key issues and recommended
research addressing these key issues/problems were summarized and
are presented in the analysis and discussion section. The
specific steps, as they relate to the organization of the report,
are given below.
• Extract the statement of purpose and/or objective of each
study. (See Purpose/Objective Summary - Appendix i)
Summarize the methodology used by each researcher.
(See Methodlogy Summary - Appendix 2)
Assemble the conclusions; results and/or findings from
each study. (See Results Summary - Appendix 3)
When specified, gather the recommended research from the
analysis of a study. (See Recommendations/Research
Summary - Appendix 4)
Disaggregate the findings from individual reports and
reaggragate to integrate them into similar subject areas.
(See Integration and Comparison - Appendix 5)
List and discuss key issues that emerge from the reports.
(Analysis and Discussion)
Identify the recommended research that will address the
problems noted• (Analysis and Discussion)
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
KEY ISSUES
A review of the integration and comparison of conclusions and
findings of the seven reports, appendix 5, identified key issues in
SPIFR operations. The key issues are synthesized below and are
assembled under six rather broad subject areas. Any change or
improvement in one area usually affects the SPIFR operations in
another area. Thus a key issue may not be a "stand alone" concern,
but inter-related to other activities in SPIFR operations.
A definite consistency exists in the characteristics of the
'composite' or 'average' pilot as described by the studies using
questionnaires, NTSB reports, and ASRS reports. Since there are no
real conflicting comparisons, it is suggested (not proven) that the
"real world" is being sampled in these studies.
The following is a summary of the key issues that emerged from
the review.
A. Skill/Proficiency/Decision Making/_
Statistics of accidents on final approach where the
aircraft is under control and has a collision with a
stationary object on the ground suggests that the pilot:
T) may not be proficient at flying the aircraft, 2) has
had inadequate training, or 3) cannot recognize and make
timely corrections to positional deviations (particularly
at night).
Reported incidents confirm frequent pilot deviations in
altitude, heading and position, and improperly flown
approaches, improper holding procedures, and below
minimum operations.
Pilots report difficulties in maintaining recency of
experience thus allowing their proficiency to
deteriorate.
Future complex and sophisticated ATC procedures, and new
complex and sophisticated aircraft will require extensive
pilot training to update to these new systems and
equipment.
The pilot's judgment and decision making process,
including the ability to plan ahead and the ability to
assess his/her own capabilities and limitations, needs
improvement.
B. Weather/Conditions of Li_h_tt
A need exists for improvements in the process of
obtaining weather information.
Preflight planning and in-flight weather updates are
similar in the kinds of information required.
Weather information is desired that is timely, is
reliable, pilots have confidence in, and eliminates
unforeseen and unanticipated weather encounters.
The forecasting and reporting of thunderstorms and icing
are of particular importance. SPIFR pilots consider
icing and thunderstorms to be most threatening
experiences in flight. Ice is identified as a
contributor to a significant number of SPIFR accidents.
Pilots did not emphasize or note any shortcomings in
reporting of low ceilings and fog, but their importance
is manifested in approach accidents that increase as
visibility decreases.
Relatively, there are significantly more accidents at
night than during the day. This suggests that pilots
should have more familiarity and training in night
operations.
C. ATC/Communications/Procedures/Nav Aids
Communications, the exchange of information,is a
consistent subject throughout the reports. Part of the
communications problem is understanding what is being
said and intended by both the Air Traffic Controllers and
the Pilots.
Part of the communications problem is the workload on the
pilot. Workload can come from having to speak, making a
frequency change, or performing in reponse to an ATC
instruction.
Some of the present and anticipated future Air traffic
control operations and procedures are complex and
involved.
Some of the communications problems include ATC
intra-facility and inter-facility exchanges that impact
on the SPIFR flight.
Information required for flight planning, its
availability, and its ease of use is a concern to the
SPIFR pilot.
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D. Workload/Distraction
A heavy workload for a SPIFR Pilot can be simply an
annoyance or it can end in a catastrophic event.
Weather, ATC, and aircraft complexities all impact on
workload.
Excessive workload may be a contributor to the problems
of position deviations, misunderstood communications, or
fuel systems mismanagement.
Workload can result in distractions from a principle task
which leads to deterioration in performance.
Workload is of additional concern as IFR traffic in the
future may increase and the ATC procedures may become
more complex and demanding.
E. Cockpit Environment/_Displays/Aircraft Control
Pilots complain of inadequate lighting in the
cockpit/cabin area and of a noisy cockpit environment.
Lighting contributes to the pilot's ability to
read/obtain information from charts at night while noise
contributes to the level of fatigue.
Other areas of concern are the instrument panel/controls
arrangement and design, and the use of flight, directors
and/or autopilots.
F. Aircraft Separation
• The task of maintaining aircraft separation in high
density areas and of reducing the potential for VFR/IFR
conflicts are goals that permeate other considerations.
RESEARCH ADDRESSING KEY ISSUES
Some of the key issues identify existing or potential problems
of SPIFR operations. The authors of some of the reports have
suggested general areas that need to be investigated to solve these
problems or prevent future problems from arising.
The authors have also identified several relevant considerations
that need to be addressed in deciding on the research to be
performed. The following are three examples.
• "research aimed at solving these problems must emphasize
low cost, low volume, low weight equipment, and human
factors considerations." (R. 2, p. 19)
6
"a major theme that is expressed, or is evident, in all
the ASRS data is the frequent involvement of human error
in the incidents reported." (R. 4, p.3, para. 3)
"Further detailed analysis of the survey data can provide
additional insight into the nature of the GA SPIFR and his
operational problems ...... (R. 6, p. 24)
These three quotes emphasize three important factors relevant to
SPIFR research: the economics of solutions are important; human
factors weaves its way throughout the SPIFR problems; and more
research can be done on the data already collected.
The specificity of an investigation or research task recommended
varies considerably between reports. This is primarily due to the
different data sources, i.e. accident data, incident data,
questionnaire response data, and interviews, used in the different
reports. In order to keep intact the flavor of each author, the
recommendations recorded in this section are in their original form.
The following quotes are used to specify the recommended
research or research areas to address the key issues noted earlier.
A. Skill/Proficiency/Decision Making/Trainin_
Better methods for pilots to safely acquire experience
and increase proficiency (R. 2, p. 20)
More effective pilot training methods (R. 2, p. 20)
Enhance IFR Training Programs (R. 3, p. 5-12)
Pilot judgment and response problems (R. 4, p. 12)
Pilot Judgment and Decision Making - Improve pilot's
ability to plan ahead - improve pilot's ability to more
accurately assess his own capabilities and limitations
(R. 6, p. 24)
The impact of simulated instrument time upon the
likelihood of a SPIFR accident. Specifically, one would
very much like to know how much impact reporting
procedures in the NTSB accident briefs effect the
statistics discussed in this report relating to
simulated instrument time. Why are the levels of
simulated instrument time that appear for the SPIFR
pilots in the NTSB data base and the Ohio State survey
as diverse as they are? (R. 7, p. 42)
Bi Weather/Conditions of Light
New types of deicing or anti-icing equipment
(R. 2, p. 20)
Better cockpit displays of weather information
(R. 2, p. 20)
Develop Remote Weather Display concepts
(R. 3, p. 5.6)
Weather Information - improve availability, reliability
and timeliness (especially with respect to icing and
thunderstorms) (R. 6, p. 24)
The disparity between day and night SPIFR accident
rates. Out of 5,416 SPIFR accidents from 1964 to 1975
which involved pilot error, only 14 percent occurred at
night• Based upon our estimate of night time activity
(12.8 percent of overall activity) derived from the
"General Aviation Pilot and Aircraft Activity Survey",
it appears that SPIFR accident rates are unaffected by
the condition of light while SPIFR approach/landing
phase accident rates are magnified by" 10 fold (R. 7,
p. 42)
C • ATC/Communications/Procedures/Nav Aids
• Low/Medium frequency receivers which can give on-course
information (R. 2, p. 20)
• Standardized and human factors designed navigation
instrument displays (R. 2, p. 20)
• Low-altitude warning systems (R. 2, p. 20)
• Area Coverage Systems for Non-Precision Aids
(R. 3, p. 5-10)
• Efficient Route Reorganization of RNAV (R. 3, p. 5-14)
• Requirements of Automated and Remote Towers
(R. 3, p. 5-8)
. Innovative Communications Procedures (R. 3, p. 5-13)
• Alternative Precision Landing Aids (R. 3, p. 5-9)
. Advanced HUD, VASI and Approach Monitor concepts
(R. 3, p. 5-11)
• Assess Data Link Avionics Requirements (R. 3, p. 5-7)
8
Do
E •
Fo
. ATC and pilot communication problems (R. 4, p. 12)
• Controller judgment and response problems (R. 4, p. 12)
• ATC intrafacility and interfacility conflicts
(R. 4, p. 12)
• Communications - minimize communications workload
(R. 6, p. 24)
• Instrument approaches - revise ATC procedures to
minimize pilot workload (R. 6, p. 24)
Workload/Distraction
• Improved fuel management systems (R. 2, p. 20)
• Improved air-to-ground communications which would reduce
pilot workload (R. 2, p. 20)
• Workload - Optimize wherever feasible (R. 6, p. 24)
Cockpit Environment Display Aircraft Control
Cockpit displays of aircraft position on area mapping
(R. 2, p. 20)
Improved basic aircraft stability and control
(R. 2, p. 20)
Configuration Control and Display Integration
(R. 3, p. 5-1)
Develop Distributed Management/Traffic Situation Display
Concepts (R. 3, p. 5-4)
Cockpit Environment - Better lighting - Better noise
protection (R. 6, p. 24)
Aircraft Separation
• Promote Collision Avoidance System Proximity Warning
Indicator Development (R. 3, p. 5-3)
• IFR-VFR conflicts (R. 4, p. 12.)
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SUMMARYAND CONCLUDING REMARKS
The review and analysis of the seven studies resulted in both
expected and unexpected results. As expected, the major problem
areas, as defined in the individual reports, were generally
corroborated by findings of the other reports. In some cases,
however, even though a problem area was not considered a major
problem in any given report, the occurrence of that problem in a
majority of the reports amplifies its significance in SPIFR
operations.
The analysis of the data included summaries of the purpose/
objective, methodology, results, and recommendations/research of
each report. This information was compiled and is presented in
appendices 1-4. The integration and comparisons of these data were
used to determine the key issues/problems and are presented in
appendix 5. A summary of key issues/problems, appendix 5, and
recommended research are presented in the analysis and discussion
section.
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APPENDIX 1
Purpose/Objective Summar Z
All of the reports related to the general Aviation pilot
operating under instrument flight rules• Each study was read to
determine the purpose and/or objective of the study• Statements
have been extracted for ease in comparison. (Emphasis and
underlining provided by the writer of this report.)
RI- Study to Determine the Operational Profile and Mission of the
Certificated Instrument Rated Private and Commercial Pilot,
"The purpose of the proposed study is to determine the
operational profile and mission of the certificated
instrument rated private _d commercial pilot. This study is
the first phase of a Federal Aviation Administration effort
which has as its objective the feasibility of training pilots
to a standard of operational competence as a criterion for
instrument rating certification." (p.l)
"The objectives of the study are:
io Conduct a survey, statistically reliable, of the
instrument rated private and commercial pilot.
. Use a mail questionnaire approach of such scope as to
produce information for which there can be developed an
operational flight profile and mission of the instrument
rated pilot.
. From the information gained in the survey, develop two
operational flight prqfiles depicting:
(a) the most difficult and complex operation.
(b) the medium operation.
o Analyze the two profiles to determine those aeronautical
skills and knowledge _equined to conduct safely such
missions and profiles in today's air traffic control
environment." (p.2)
i-i
R2- Single Pilot IFR Operating Problems Determined from Accident
Data Analysis
"A general consensus is that one of the problems related to
_ilot error is the _ -_le pilot workload on an
%nstrument flight. To determine if this consensus is true,
to define other problems areas, and identify aneas of
research in _ pilot IFR (SPIFR) operations, it was
decided that the general aviation accident report files of
the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) should be
examined and analyzed." (p. 2)
"An examination and analysis of the single pilot instrument
flight rule (SPIFR) accident data for the years 1964-1975,
compiled by the National Transportation Safety Board, was
made fo___qthe purpose of identifyin _ critical problem areas in
SPIFR operations. The accident reports examined------were
restricted to instrument rated pilots flying IFR weather. A
brief examination was made of accidents which occurred during
all phases of flight and which were due to all causes. A
detailed examination was made of those accidents which
involved a single pilot, which occurred during the landing
phase of flight, and were due to pilot error. The landing
phase was selected because of the large number of accidents
that occurred in this phase." (p. 18)
R3- General Aviation IFR Operational Problems
"This report presents the results of a study of general
aviation IFR operators, particularly single pilot operators.
The study was concerned with the operational problems these
operators face, both now and in the next ten to twent_
_ear8." (p. i-i) --
"The intent of this study is to address the problems of
single-pilot operators in the National Air Space System."
(p. 2-1 )
R4- Analysis of General Aviation Single Pilot IFR Incident Data
Obtained from the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System
Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) data base is a
compilation of voluntary incident reports from any persons
who has observed or been involved in an occurrence which was
believed to have posed a threat to flight safety.... This
paper examines ASRS data for incidents related to _eneral
aviation SPIFR operation'8. In particular, all reports of
general aviat{on fixed-wing aircraft flying under IFR in
instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) are analyzed."
(p. 1)
"The data in this report were obtained from the ASRS incident
data base and were used to define problems and, hence,
significant area8 for research in the general aviation SPIFR
environment." (p. 8)
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R5- Operational Problems Experienced by Single Pilots in
Instrument Meteorological Conditions
"The Objective of this study was to identify and analytically
describe the operational problems reported to the ASRS by the
general aviation airman operating as a single pilot in
instrument meteorological conditions. A further interest was
to understand the nature and t_y_pe of operational problems
being experience---d-by this class of airman, referred to as
single pilot IFR, or SPIFR." (p. 2)
R6- Study to Determine the Operational Profile of the General
Aviation Single Pilot
"The objective of the survey was to create a data base from
which could be developed an operational profile of the
general aviation single _ilot operating under instrument
flight rules (GA SPIFR)." (p.l)
"The purpose of this statistical summary report is to present
the questionnaire data in a convenient form so that it can be
reviewed and analyzed with the objective of identifying
research which could lead to the elimination on reduction of
the severity of 8pe_c problems experienced by the GA
SPIFR." (p. i)
R7- Single Pilot IFR Proficiency Analysis
"...GA SPIFR activity has continued to increase both in terms
of number of flights and number of accidents, and the
accident data from four additional years (1976-1979) have
been added to the NTSB data base. The purpose of the
research and analysis upon which this report is based was to
determine what changes, if any, have occurred in trends and
cause-effec-t relationships report-te---a in the earlier 8tu y_.
The increasing numbers have been tied to measur-_ o-f activity
to produce accident rates which in turn were analyzed in
terms of change." (p. i)
The commonality of these reports is:
• Two reports have concerns to develop an operation profile
(RI, R6)
• One report describes the aeronautical skill and knowledge
required to operate in the system (RI)
• Six reports identify the problems or problems areas of
SPIFR (R2, R3, R4, R5, R6, R7)
• Four reports lead to identifying areas of research
(R2, R3, R6, R7)
1-3

APPENDIX 2
B. Methodology Summar[
A description of the methodology used in developing the
information in each report is presented in this section. When
applicable, the population of reports used by the researcher(s) is
included.
RI- Study to Determine the Operational Profile and Mission of the
Certificated Instrument Rated Private and Commercial Pilot
In 1970 a mail questionnaire survey to 3046 of the 100,498
instrument rated Private and Commercial rated pilots was
made. 1767 usable responses were received. 739 of those
were determined to be engaged in general aviation flying.
262 were considered as complex operations (flies IFR flight
plan every other week, made an actual instrument approach
during last 12 months, had to hold at least once during last
12 months and have at least 1-360 and 1-90 channel COM
radio). The other 477 were considered medium operations.
R2- Single Pilot IFR Operating Problems Determined from Accident
Data Analysis
The NTSB Accident files for the years 1964 through 1975 were
searched for accidents concerning general aviation, fixed
wing aircraft, instrument rated pilots, who were in an actual
IFR weather. This yielded over 10.00 reports. Since a high
percentage of these accidents were in the landing phase the
report concentrates on the landing phase accidents that also
included pilot error and where IFR flight plans had been
filed. This yielded 335 accidents. These reports were
examined for specific pilot errors which were tabulated
against other accident cause/factors; different variables of
flight were cross referenced and examined quantitatively; and
the pilot's experience was examined. After analyzing the
data, problems areas were identified and suggested areas of
research were recommended.
R3- General Aviation IFR Operational Problems
Background information for the study was developed using
primarily FAA reports and statistical information. This
provided the foundation which described the general aviation
IFR operators, the IFR operating environment, the IFR cockpit
environment limitations of present avionics and planned
improvements to the ATC system. Using an event analysis, and
using additional FAA studies, NTSB accident briefs, NASA
reports and NAFEC reports, 21 GA IFR operational problem
areas were identified. Twelve broad solution areas and 16
research areas were identified.
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R4- Analysis of General Aviation Single Pilot IFR Incident Data
Obtained from the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System
A search of the ASRS data base containing 2174 incident
reports collected from May i, 1978 to January i, 1979 was
made for all reports of general aviation, fixed-wing aircraft
under IFR in IMC. 79 reports met the criteria and were
reviewed (29 reports of flight crew error and 50 reports of
ATC errors). The report 'enabling factors' and 'associated
factors' were analyzed, listed, and then catagorized into one
of five major problem areas. The relative significance of
each problem area was determined by the number of relevant
enabling factors and associated factors cited in each of the
problem areas.
R5- Operational Problems Experienced by Single Pilots in
Instrument Meteorological Conditions
A search of the reports in ASRS Database 2 for reports from
May i, 1978 through December 10, 1980 for small aircraft
(13,961 reports total) and through March 18, 1981 for small
transport aircraft (15,246 reports total) was made for SPIFR
operational problems (the safe and/or efficient conduct of a
flight was adversely affected.) Multiple pilot crews,
reports and conflicts ocurring in see-and-avoid environment
were eliminated. Only trips on IFR flight plans that
encountered IMC remained for analysis (136 reports). The
narrative of each report was analyzed and the report was
classified into one of 10 operational problem catagories
identified by the researcher. The frequency of occurrence
was totaled. Further analysis of the reports provides
insight into safety, efficiency and workload concerns.
R6- Study to Determine the Operational Profile of the General
Aviation Single Pilot
In 1981 a mail questionnaire survey was sent to 4943 of the
230,000 instrument rated and ATP pilots regarding SPIFR
operations. 2211 usable questionnaires were received. Each
question in the survey was reviewed and the frequency of like
responses were recorded. A composite SPIFR operational
profile, which consists of 38 characteristics was developed.
In addition 10 questions about the nature of the GA SPIFR
were posed by the researcher, and answers were developed
using data from one or more questions in the survey. Also an
advisory group reviewed the statistical summary to identify
problem areas of concern to the GA SPIFR.
R7- Single Pilot IFR Proficiency Analysis
A review and examination was made of NTSB SPIFR accident
reports for 1976-1979 in many of the same terms and formats
used in the study of NTSB accidents from 1964-1975.
Statistical methods were used to determine rate changes that
2-2
may have taken place. A comparison was made between the
SPIFR pilot profiles developed from "The Study to Determine
the IFR Operational Profile of the General Aviation Single
Pilot" and NTSB accident statistical database• In addition,
specific variables were related to specific types of
accidents to particular conditions• Day and night accident
rates are explored as well as an analysis of collisions with
the ground.
In Summary
• Two reports (RI, R6) use questionnaires to solicit first
hand responses from pilots on their operations
• Two reports (R2, R7) use NTSB accident reports to define
problem areas
• Two reports (R4, R5) use ASRS incident reports to gain
insights into problems
• One report (R3) uses an event analysis and statistics to
forecast problems of the GA SPIFR in the ATC system
2-3

APPENDIX 3
C. Results Summary
This section extracts the principle results from each of the
reports. In order to keep the integrity of the reports, the
results are direct quotes•
RI- Study to Determine the Operational Profile and Mission of the
Certificated Instrument Rated Private and Commercial Pilot
Based on inspection of the general aviation IFR data (739
reports) a "typical" general aviation instrument rated pilot
and his flight operation is described. Numbered items
correspond to the number of the question in the
questionnaire. (pp. 3-7)
i • He flies a complex (having retractable gear and
controllable propeller) single or multiengine aircraft,
produced since 1965, having a cruise speed of 150-159
knots, and an approach speed of 100-109 knots.
•
His aircraft has two 360 channel transceivers, two
VOR/LOC receivers, at least one glide slope receiver, ADF
and marker beacon receivers, and a transponder. It is
equipped with pitot heat and an autopilot with at least a
roll capability.
3. His aircraft is most likely to be company owned.
4. He had much to say about the selection of the aircraft.
• He received his private and commercial pilot certificates
during the 1960's and his instrument rating since 1965.
e He received his instrument rating on the basis of
completing required FAA tests and experience• He is not
a graduate of an approved flying school.
7. He is single and multiengine rated.
. He has at least 2000 hours total time, with at least 250
hours in the last twelve months.
• He flies about once per week, on an IFR flight plan about
every other week.
10. He is current on instruments, having logged at least 25
hours instrument in the last twelve months• He has at
least 140 hours total instrument time logged, at least 60
of which are actual instrument in an airplane.
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Ii. He has been a pilot in command in actual instrument
weather conditions in the last six months.
12. His last instrument dual instruction or instrument flying
evaluation ride was last year (1969).
13. During training for an instrument rating, he visited an
air traffic control tower and an approach/departure
control facility.
14. He considers 10 hours of actual instrument time
worthwhile during training for the instrument rating.
15. Data in Question 15 reflects the distribution of
responses by state.
16. He originates his IFR flights from an airport which has
an ILS or a VOR approach.
17. He has most often made ILS approaches in the last twelve
months.
18. During the last twelve months, he has most frequently
flown for business (not for hire) or personal reasons.
19. He subscribes to USC & GS flight information
publications, which are usually current.
20.
21.
22.
23.
He has had no need to cancel an IFR flight during the
last 12 months. If he has, it was because of weather
beyond his aircraft/equipment capability.
He tends to use the published minimums on instrument
approaches as his personal minimums.
He will probably go on an IFR flight if light icing or
scattered thunderstorms are reported anywhere enroute.
He probably will not go if heavy ground fog is reported.
He will usually file IFR if his destination weather is
forecast to be ceiling 5000 feet or less, visibility 5
miles or less.
24. He seldom or never cancels an IFR flight plan upon
reaching VFR conditions after departing an airport in IFR
weather.
25. He seldom or never files an IFR flight plan before
departing on a flight to be conducted entirely in the
daytime in good VFR conditions.
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26. He seldom or never files an IFR flight plan in flight.
27. 20 - 24% of his time on instrument flight plans is in
actual instrument conditions.
28. He has made an ILS approach in actual instrument
conditions during the last twelve months.
29. He operates IFR most often within a radius of 400 nm of
his home airport.
30. The one way distance of his longest non-stop IFR flight
during the last 12 months was 500 nm or less.
31. During the last 12 months, he has been rerouted or had to
hold no more than twice and has not had to execute a
missed approach or divert to an alternate.
32. He rates ILS, LOC and VOR approaches as having little
difficulty, ADF approaches as having some difficulty.
33. He almost never receives assistance from someone during
an IFR flight. When he does receive assistance, it is
from another instrument rated pilot who is not a required
copilot.
34. He has flown in a single engine aircraft in IFR, night
VFR, and night actual IFR conditions.
35. He considers the six hours of instrument experience
within the preceding 6 calendar months adequate in
maintaining a safe level of instrument proficiency.
36. He considers himself at or just below the level of a
professional pilot in aeronautical skill, knowledge, and
experience.
37. He experiences little or some difficulty, but not much or
extreme, in conducting IFR flights during departure,
transition and approach phases.
38. He believes heading control to be the aspect of flying
performance to deteriorate first as a "normal" IFR flight
becomes more difficult because of IFR conditions.
39. He believes the reasons for his flying performance
deterioration mentioned in the previous question to be
caused by lack of recent instrument flying experience.
40. He believes the most common errors made by instrument
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41.
42.
pilots are:
(I) not knowing personal limitations.
(2) not planning ahead.
(3) allowing skills to deteriorate.
He would like to see a requirement for actual instrument
experience made a part of the training and regulations
concerning the certification of new instrument pilots.
He mentions structural icing or thunderstorms as his most
uncomfortable or threatening experience during an IFR
flight in actual IFR conditions.
The complex instrument pilot profile was compared to the
medium instrument pilot.
i. The complex pilot flies a more sophisticated aircraft.
It has higher cruise and instrument approach speed,
communications and navigation equipment with greater
capability, and more special equipment. (Q. 1 and 2)
2. The complex pilot operates at busier airports. (Q. 17)
3. He is more likely to make approaches tO minimums than the
medium pilot. (Q. 21)
4. The complex pilot will make a "go" decision more often
than the medium pilot in more adverse weather situations.
(Q. 22)
5. In good VFR conditions, the complex pilot will more
frequently file an IFR flight plan. (Q. 23 and 25)
6. He more often finds it necessary to file an IFR flight
plan in flight. (Q. 26)
7. He is more likely to have made an actual instrument
approach to lower minimums than the medium pilot.
(Q. 28)
8. The complex pilot is more likely to have had to execute a
missed approach or had to divert to an alternate.
(Q. 31)
9. He has less difficulty in making instrument approaches.
(Q. 32) (Page 29)
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The intent of the skill and knowledge requirements to safely
operate in the ATC system of 1970 is to indicate generalized
modifications to the present process of certificating the
instrument rated pilot in a manner which will make it more
consistent with how he actually operates in today's air
traffic control system. (P. 31)
A. Task Ac_: CONTROLOF AIRCRAFT (P. 37)
• Both the complex and the medium pilot must have
demonstrated their ability to make an ILS and a VOR
approach to the published minimums•
. Both pilots must have logged some actual instrument
time during their training for an instrument rating.
• The medium pilot shall not be permitted to make
approaches as low as the complex pilot.
• The complex pilot shall be required to demonstrate
more precise aircraft control, especially heading and
altitude, and particularly in the approach phase.
Determination shall be made objectively be reference
to quantitative standards of performance•
B. Task Activity: COMMUNICATION WITH ATC
• Both pilots must have visited an approach/departure
control facility during their training for an
instrument rating•
• The medium pilot must make communications which are
correct in content, with acknowledgement and proper
control response accomplished within a reasonable
amount of time. Execution of ATC instructions must
be accomplished in a manner which will not endanger
himself or adversely interfere with the functions of
the air traffic control system.
. The complex pilot must communicate concisely,
accurately, and promptly• Required control responses
should be immediate. Forgetting air traffic control
instructions or incorrect control responses shall be
disqualifying.
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C. Task Activity: USE OF PRINTED INFORMATION (P. 38)
i • The medium pilot must be sufficiently familiar with
flight information publications to find needed
information in a reasonable amount of time and
without excessive performance deterioration under
normal IFR conditions.
• The complex pilot must be able to refer to flight
information publications and promptly ascertain
information required without a deterioration in
performance under non-normal IFR conditions.
n. Task Activity: DECISION MAKING (P. 38)
I• Both the medium and complex pilot shall demonstrate
his understanding of hazardous weather and emergency
situations by means of an oral and/or written
analysis of a typical hazardous weather situation.
• The medium pilot must demonstrate his knowledge of
the characteristics and hazards associated with icing
and thunderstorm conditions. He must know how to
avoid such contingencies.
• The medium pilot must demonstrate an ability to
anticipate future tasks to the extent that essential
preparations are performed prior to the time it
causes his proper relationship to the system to be
lost.
• The complex pilot, in addition to demonstrating his
knowledge of the characteristics and hazards
associated with icing and thunderstorm conditions,
must demonstrate his ability in operating aircraft
anti and deicing equipment, and knowledge of the
flying techniques associated with icing and
thunderstorms.
• The complex pilot must demonstrate a higher order
ability to anticipate future tasks and manage his
flight.
1 The complex pilot shall demonstrate his ability to
make a missed approach to a holding pattern.
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Data Analysis
A detailed examination of accidents involving a single pilot,
which occurred during the landing phase of flight, and which
was due to pilot error resulted in the following information.
(p. 18-19 )
Single-pilot pilot error accidents are increasing at a
rate of 3.5 accidents per year. This rate is three times
the dual-pilot pilot error rate. There were 877
single-pilot pilot error accidents, 446 of which occurred
during the landing phase. Of the 446, there were 335 on
IFR flight plan.
Improper IFR operations were given as a cause/factor in
170 of the 335 SPIFR accidents. In 104 of the improper
IFR operations accidents fog was also a cause/factor and
in 68 low ceiling was a cause/factor. Icing was a
cause/factor in 56 accidents and fuel exhaustion was a
cause/factor in 14.
There were 152 SPIFR accidents where the aircraft collided
wings level with trees or with the ground. In 63 percent
of these the visibility was one _ile or less and in 70
percent it was dark.
Of the 335 SPIFR accidents there were 96 which occurred
while the pilot was executing an ILS approach and 90 while
executing a VOR approach. In general, the approaches
which allowed lower descents had a higher percentage of
accidents at night.
There were 139 SPIFR accidents which occurred during final
approach. In these cases, the number of accidents doubled
for every mile decrease in visibility. The initial
approach phase had the highest fatality rate with .63
fatal accidents per accident. There were no fatalities in
the leveloff/touchdown or rollout accidents.
There were 240 SPIFR accidents which occurred in fog, 180
in the dark, and 62 in below minimums weather. Air
taxi-parssenger and ferry operations had the highest below
minimums accident rates.
Commercial pilots were involved in 56 percent of the 335
accidents, however, the number of accidents per 100,000
private pilots was three times that of commercial pilots.
Forty-six of the accidents involved professional pilots.
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The pilots in the 335 accidents had an average of 3000
hours total pilot time. The pilots with less than 300
hours total time had the highest estimated accident rate
and pilots with more than 7000 hours had the lowest. The
accident rate for pilots with less than 100 hours of
actual instrument time was one-half that of pilots with
more instrument time. The accident rate was lowest for
pilots with less than 25 hours in 90 days and highest for
pilots with more than 200 hours.
Fifty-eight percent of the SPIFR accidents occurred in
twin engine aircraft whereas an estimated 45 percent of
the IFR operations were conducted in twins.
After analyzing the accident data, the following problem
areas were identified.
Landing phase operations, especially on the final approach
segment
Low visibility operations at night due to fog and low
ceilings
Flight in icing conditions when the aircraft is not
deicing or anti-icing equipped
• Imprecise IFR navigation
• Below minimums approaches
Weather data dissemination techniques and pilot
understanding
Fuel mismanagement and inadequate fuel quantity
information
Pilot overconfidence due to high instrument time and time
in last 90 days
• Low pilot time in aircraft type
. High workload, especially in twin engine aircraft
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A summary of the major SPIFR operational problems determined
by the study is in the following list: (pp. 4-52 and 4-53)
and (pp. 6-1 thru 6-3)
A. PILOT FACTORS:
IFR Training Inadequacies
High Workload in Critical Flight Phases
High Workload in High Density Environments
Future Traffic Growth Rate in High Density Areas
Potential Workload Impacts of New ATC Features
Growing Vehicle Control Complexity
B. MISSION RELIABILITY AND EFFICIENCY:
Flight Planning Information Availability
Flight Delays in Dense Terminal Areas
Lengthy Delays/Diversions in IMC
Limited Availability of Landing Aids
Routing Inefficiencies
Enroute Weather Avoidance Delays
Low Density Area Delays Due to Lack of Tower
C. SAFETY:
Maintaining Required Separation
Weather-Related Accidents
Growing Airborne Alert Environment Complexity
Final Approach Accidents
3-9
R3- Continued
D. COMMUNICATIONS:
Communications Channel Congestion
Communications Errors, Omissions and Dropouts
Lack of Tower or Off-Hours Services
Access to Evolving Ground Data Base
The general conclusions stated in this section are presented
in an effort to emphasize the magnitude and pervasiveness of
the GA IFR operator's problems.
A.
Bm
C,
At present GA IFR operations constitute a major segment
of the U.S. air transportation system. Projections show
that in the future, GA IFR operations will grow to the
point where they will dominate air carrier operations in
terms of sheer numbers. This is true in high density
urban areas as well as outlying areas. The major finding
of this study is that the GA IFR operator's problems are
very serious, and will get much worse.
The primary role of the FAA is to be the provider of ATC
services. Thus it is in character that the thrust of the
FAA's own modernization program is to improve the
efficiency with which such services are provided, without
necessarily concentrating on the efficiency of the
services themselves or the particular needs of the
various classes of operators. The resulting ATC
facilities modernization plans for the most part will
result in continued, or increased, operating costs for GA
IFR operators while not significantly improving the
efficiency of their operations. Potential exceptions
include the program for improved weather data collection
and distribution, the ATARS concept, factors improving
airport capacities, and area navigation (which will be
implemented very slowly).
ATC plans for expansions to positive controlled airspace
through reductions in the altitude "floor" and through
expansions to the number of TCA's tends to drive general
aviation out of that airspace, and in particular, drives
lower capability IFR operators away while, possibly,
attracting the higher capability IFR operators (45).
Unfortunately for the lower capability GA IFR operators
he is therefore being driven away from the ve_ services
he needs so desperately.
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D• In light of the above factors, the cost to a GA IFR
operator to improve his mission reliability on his own is
very high and the payoff which results is often
insufficient to cover that cost. Likewise, the cost to
an airport operator to provide the ground segments of
these ATC services is very high utilizing present
technology, and so is typically justified only at
airports with significant air carrier traffic, or very
large GA airports.
E • The tendency of the ATC system to control more and more
airspace as time passes provides improved safety to
controlled aircraft but at a general price of reduce-_
operating efficiency for those aircraft. Also such
trends tend to drive many operators out of that airspace,
actually degrading their safety of operation by
compressing them in a smaller amount of airspace. A
potential solution to this problem is to improve the
means by which aircraft operators can manage their own
separation and ATC procedures, either through air-derived
collision avoidance sensors, or through the display of
ground-derived traffic data.
El A comprehensive, well planned attack on the operational
problems of GA IFR operators is needed to provide viable
and economical solutions in order that such a valuable
transportation resource can develop to the benefit of
all. This program will include research which not only
addresses the technology development issues, but the
operational procedures issues as well.
R4- Analysis of General Aviation Single Pilot IFR Incident Data
Obtained from the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System
The incident reports were used to define problems and several
elements for each problem were determined• (p. 13)
A.
Bo
Controller judgment and response problems
-Excessive/impeding procedural requirements
-Training/proficiency/experience related mistakes
-Equipment operational problems
Pilot judgment and response problems
-Excessive/impeding procedural requirements
-Training/proficiency flight infractions
-Limitations due to limited avionics
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C
O$
ATC intrafacility and interfacility conflicts
-Internal communication problems
-Hand-off problems
-Mixed departure and arrival conflicts
-Equipment operational problems
ATC and pilot communication problems
-Misunderstanding of instructions
-Frequency congestion
-Excessive frequency changes
-Excessive/impeding procedural requirements
Eo IFR-VFR conflicts
-Aircraft proximity at breakout
-IFR flight in VFR and MVFR conditions
A review of the problem areas also pinpointed several points
common to all or most of the problems. These included human
error, communications, procedures and rules, and workload.
R5- Operational Problems Experienced by Single Pilots in
Instrument Meteorological Conditions
Analysis of the 136 reports in the ASRS database produced 9
conclusions. (pp. 35-36)
A.
So
Ten SPIFR Operational Problem Categories have been
identified in the ASRS-2 database. In order of
decreasing frequency of occurrence, they are: Pilot
Allegations of Inadequate Service (30 percent), Altitude
Deviation (20 percent), Improperly Flown Approach (15
percent), Heading Deviation (13 percent), Position
Deviation (7 percent), Below Minimums Operations (6
percent), Loss of Airplane Control (3 percent), Forgot
Mandatory Report (3 percent), Fuel Problem (2 percent),
and Improper Holding (2 percent).
It appears that the operational problems being
experienced by the SPIFR may be independent of
experience. Although this hypothesis needs to be tested
more thoroughly, it is suggested that if the hypothesis
were found to be valid then remedies to SPIFR operational
problems do not lie in improving SPIFR capabilities
through more training and experience. Rather, the nature
of the SPIFR task should be changed through the redesign
of cockpit systems and ATC procedures in handling the
SPIFR.
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C • Safety, Efficiency, and Workload factors are present in
SPIFR Operational Problem occurrences. Half of the
occurrences involved an act or condition likely to lead
to grave consequences, and one-third involved an act or
condition of ignorant or imprudent deviation from
acceptable procedures. In more than one-third of the
occurrences, the efficiency of IFR flight was depending
upon what determinant is used to assess workload, between
one-quarter and three-quarters of the occurrences
involved workload as causal factor.
De The most frequently identified SPIFR Operational Problem
was a pilot's allegation of inadequate service.
Three-quarters of such allegations are deemed reasonable.
E. A pilot's "mind set" was a factor in altitude deviations,
appearing in 68 percent of the occurrences.
F. Lack of pilot proficiency is apparent in improperly flown
approach occurrences. In 22 percent of these
occurrences, there was evidence that pilots did not
understand when not to execute a procedure turn.
G w The pilot's lack of awareness of his position is an
important factor in position deviation occurrences.
H.
Takeoff below minimums occurrences were related to the
pilot's cognitive processes. Landing below minimums
occurrences probably could have been prevented by better
preflight weather planning and more conservative decision
making by the pilot.
I • Loss of airplane control generally followed the pilot
being distracted. Even relatively experienced pilots
lost airplane control.
R6- Study to Determine the Operational Profile of the General
Aviation Single Pilot
A composite description of the GA SPIFR and his operational
profile was developed from an inspection of the data in the
statistical summary. Each item is referenced to the number
of the question in the questionnaire. (i.e.Q.I) (pp. 4-7)
Q. i. He flies a single engine airplane (four places and
over), having retractable gear and controllable
propeller, produced since 1974, having a cruise speed
of 140-149 knots, and an instrument approach speed of
100-109 knots.
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Qo 2. His airplane is equipped with two communications
transceivers, two VOR/LOC recievers, one glide slope
receiver, an ADF and a marker beacon receiver,
transponder with altitude encoder, and a DME receiver.
It has an autopilot with roll and heading capability.
It is also equipped with pitot heat and a headset boom
microphone.
Qo 3, In his opinion, inaccurately assessing and exceeding
one's personal limitations and capabilities is the most
common error made by IFR single pilots.
Q.4. The one most serious problem which he has encountered
in hT_-experience as an IFR single pilot has been
icing.
Q.5. He handled the problem by obtaining an ATC clearance to
a different altitude/heading.
Q.6. Unforecast and unanticipated weather was the most
frequent unanticipated thing which happened during his
last three flights as an IFR single pilot.
Q.7. Better, more up to date weather information/briefings
is the one change in the system which would make his
IFR single pilot flight operations easier.
Qo8. Given a single engine airplane with one NAV/COM/LOC,
and $7,500, he would purchase the following additional
equipment: transponder, 360 or 720 channel
transceiver, glideslope receiver, marker beacon
receiver, second VOR/LOC receiver, pitot heat, ADF
receiver and an altitude encoder.
Q.9. He believes that instrument approach procedures should
be included in his biennial flight review.
Q.10. He has experienced no difficulties with instrument
flight instruction, procedures and techniques.
Q. II. In obtaining preflight aviation weather information, he
almost always makes a direct call to FSS; often uses TV
weather; seldom visits FSS, seldom uses PATWAS or TWEB;
and never uses "AM Weather" or the newspaper.
Q.12. In obtaining inflight aviation weather, he almost
always uses ATIS; often uses direct FSS communication
or EFAS; seldom uses ARTCC or TWEB.
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Q.13. He believes that ATC demands are a problem during
instrument approaches, and that better controller
awareness about the nature of the GA SPIFR operation
would solve this problem.
Q.14. He believes that inadequate lighting is a cockpit
environment problem, and that better lighting would
solve this problem.
Q.15. He believes that there are no navigation type problems.
Q.16. He believes that the Federal Aviation Regulations and
ATC procedures are too complex and excessive, and that
they should be simplified.
Q.17. He believes that maintaining recency of experience is a
problem, and that the use of more simulators would
solve this problem.
Q.18. He believes that poor stability is a problem in
airplane stability and control and that the use of an
autopilot would solve this problem.
Q.19. He believes that the reliability of FSS weather
information is a problem, but cannot recommend a
solution to the problem.
Q.20. He believes icing to be a weather problem and that
radar more sensitive to weather phenomena should be
developed.
Q.21. He believes that too many communications frequency
changes are a problem, and that the system should be
designed so as to require fewer frequency changes.
Q.22. As a "normal" IFR flight becomes more difficult because
of workload, ATC communications and clearance
interpretation is the aspect of his flying performance
which is most likely to deteriorate. He attributes
this deterioration to getting too busy with other
tasks, having his attention divided, and not having
enough time.
Q.23. During an instrument approach in actual IFR conditions,
he often encounters the "normal" IFR condition and has
little difficulty with it. He seldom encounters
minimum ceiling and/or visibility, light or moderate
icing, light or moderate turbulence, or nonroutine ATC
instructions; when he does, he experiences little
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difficulty in handling the situation. He seldom
encounters scattered or broken thunderstorms, or strong
winds; when he does, he has some difficulty in handling
the situation.
Q.24. He flies from one of the higher aviation activity
states, having a high percentage of the nations's more
than 13,000 airports and 210,000 general aviation
aircraft.
Q.25. During the last twelve months, the most frequent
approach he has flown was an ILS approach with radar
assistance available.
Q.26. He seldom has someone assist him in the airplane during
a flight in actual IFR conditions. If he does, the
person is a pilot but does not have an instrument
rating, and is not a required copilot.
Q.27. He would often prefer to have someone assist him in the
airplane during flight in actual IFR conditions.
Q.28. During the last twelve months, when he has had to
cancel an IFR single pilot flight just before planned
departure it was because of weather beyond his personal
limitations.
Q.29. During the daytime, he would go when light icing, light
or moderate turbulence, heavy rain, scattered or broken
thunderstorms, IFR over mountains, or IFR over water
were reported to exist anywhere enroute. He would not
go during the day if moderate icing, lines of
thunderstorms, heavy ground fog or weather below
minimums were reported. At night, he would go when
light or moderate turbulence, scattered thunderstorms,
or IFR over water were reported to exist anywhere
enroute. He would not go at night if any of the other
previously mentioned conditions were reported.
Q.30. He uses the published minimums on instrument approach
procedures as his personal minimums.
Q.31. If the weather were reported to be below minimums at
his destination airport, he would not fly the approach.
Q.32. During the last twelve months, he has (a) filed IFR ten
times, (b) had to hold once, (c) not had to execute a
missed approach, (d) been rerouted twice, (e) not had
to divert to an alternate, (f) not had to ask for an
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altitude change due to icing, (g) asked for a route
change due to thunderstorms once, (h) not had to
declare an emergency, (i) not requested special
handling.
Q.33. He received his private pilot certificate in 1970, his
instrument rating in 1973, his commercial certificate
in 1974, and his multi-englne rating in 1976. He is
not ATP and is not an instrument flight instructor.
Q.34. During the last twelve months, all flying and single
pilot IFR flying was for personal (pleasure) or
business (not for hire) purposes.
Q.35. During the last twelve months, he flew VFR and on an
IFR flight plan more than four times per month, but in
actual IFR conditions less than once per month.
Q.36. On a scale of one (low) to six (high), he scores his
skill and experience at four, his knowledge at five.
Q.37. In the last twelve months, he has logged 210 hours
total time, 190 as pilot in command, less than 20
single pilot actual instrument and less than 20
simulated instrument in an airplane and in a ground
trainer. He has 2050 hours total time, 1750 pilot in
command, less than 100 single pilot actual instrument,
and less than 100 simulated instrument in an airplane
and ground trainer.
Q.38. He is a 40 year old male.
The GA SPIFR data set has considerable potential for
answering questions about the nature of the GA SPIFR flight
operation in terms of his airplane and equipment characteristics.
In order to use this potential properly, however, first an
appropriate and relevant question must be formulated. Then, the
right combination of data must be analyzed with the correct
statistical analysis techniques in order to develop a reasonable
answer.
As an illustration that the survey data can be used to answer
questions about the nature of the GA SPIFR, relatively simple
questions are presented in the pages which follow, and the answer
is developed using data from the GA SPIFR survey.
QUERY 3: How many respondents have not encountered a problem
_n a particular area?
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CONCLUSION: A high percentage of SPIFR's are not
experiencln_--g any problems with the various activities,
systems, and environments to which they are exposed during
the conduct of a SPIFR flight.
QUERY4: What is the relationship between the different types
o-_ airplanes being flown SPIFR and the single pilot actual
instrument flight time flown in the last 12 months?
CONCLUSION: More total SPIFR hours are being flown in
alrplanes appearing with greater frequency. The more
complex the airplane, the greater the average hours flown.
The turbojet sample is too small for meaningful results.
QUERY 5: What is the relationship between the type of SPIFR
_-_ng and the type of airplane most often flown SPIFR?
CONCLUSION: The more sophisticatd the airplane, the more
likely it is to be used in a business or air transportation
for hire function.
QUERY 6: What is the relationship between the type of SPIFR
flying and the equipment aboard the airplane most often flown
SPIFR?
CONCLUSION: Aircraft used for business or air
transportation functions are likely to be better equipped.
QUERY 7: Are the operational problems experienced by the SPIFR
_ent of experience?
CONCLUSION: Based upon this analysis, which reveals the
relatively high commonality of response codes reported
between categories of pilots of different experience levels,
it appears that the operational problems experienced by the
SPIFR are independent of experience. If this hypothesis is
valid, then it is suggested that remedies to SPIFR
operational problems do not lie in improving SPIFR
capabilities through more training and experience. Rather,
the nature of the SPIFR task should be changed through the
redesign of cockpit systems and ATC procedures in handling
the SPIFR.
Categories of pilots for analysis:
A - Less than 10 hours single pilot actual instrument in
last 12 months (n= 726)
B - 60 hours or more single pilot actual instrument in last
12 months (n=130)
C - 30 hours or more single pilot actual instrument in last
12 months and has been a flight instructor/instrument
(n=168)
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QUERY10: Was there any information gleaned from the 231
respondents who returned unusable questionnaires?
CONCLUSION: An analysis of the 231 unusable returns
revealed the following breakdown of responses:
Response Number Percent
I never fly SPIFR (it's unsafe) 83 36%
All my flying is military 53 23
All my flying is airline 40 17
I have not flown IFR for some time 16 07
Unusable response 14 06
I am retired and do not fly 13 06
All other 12 05
Total 231 100%
QUERY ii: What is the comparison between the certificates held
by the respondents in the GA SPIFR data set to the total
sample?
CONCLUSION: An analysis of the certificate composition of
both the GA SPIFR data set and the total sample disclosed
the following distribution:
GA SPIFR
Data Set Total Sample
Certificate Number Percent Number Percent
Private 368 23% 750 15%
Commercial 878 54 2889 58
ATP 373 23 1304 26
Total 1619 4943
QUERY 12: Can the results of this survey be compared to any
earlier surveys?
CONCLUSION: Yes, a similar survey was conducted by the
Federal Aviation Administration in 1970. (_) Of particular
interest are the following comparisons:
3-19
R6- Continued
Most common error made by instrument rated pilots;
(Q. 40)
Not knowing personal limitations
Not planning ahead
Confidence in being able to handle weather
16%
16
06
1981 Survey _ (Q. 3)
Not planning ahead
Overconfidence/ignorance in being able to handle
weather limitations capabilities
Exceeding inaccurate assessment of personal
limitations/capabilities
16%
ii
08
Most uncomfortable or threatening experience/
one most serious problem encountered:
1970 Survey (Q. 42)
Structural icing
Thunderstorms
1981 Survey (Q. 4)
Icing (structural or induction system)
Thunderstorms
29%
12
16%
07
R7- Single Pilot IFR Proficiency Analysis
PREVIOUS TRENDS REEXAMINED
Summary on Trends. The overall conclusion of the authors
after compiling and analyzing the data to update the charts
from the previous report (reference A), is that SPIFR
accident frequency, totals, causes, and trends have undergone
little overall change since the previous study. Thus, the
conclusions, conjecture, and recommendations of the original
work remain as valid today as they did when written. With
this in mind, conjecture on small nuances has been held to a
minimum so that maximum effort could be devoted to more
detailed analysis of factors associated with controlled and
uncontrolled collisions with the ground/water. (P. 13)
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PILOT PROFILES
Summary: Based upon the results of this section, the
indications are that the SPIFR pilot involved in one or more
accidents (i.e. from the NTSB data) has comparable amounts of
total flight hours and is as current in flight time over the
previous 90 days as is the typical GA pilot. However, there
appears to be statistically significant differences in the
amount of instrument experience each of the two groups have.
One logically would expect the differences between the groups
to both be off in the same direction for simulated and actual
instrument hours, but such is not the case. The actual
instrument experience of the typical NTSB SPIFR pilot is
greater than that of the general population GA pilot while
the latter's simulated instrument experience is higher than
the NTSB representative. (P. 17)
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APPENDIX 4
Recommendations/Research SummarZ
In this section, the recommendations for investigation or
research activities to address problems are extracted from each
report• For each report, the recommendations (if any) are listed
as they appear in the report. The differences in the form of the
recommendations reflect the purpose of the study that was
conducted by an investigator and the specificity that was expected
of the product of the study•
RI- Study to Determine the Operational Profile and Mission of the
Certificated Instrument Rated Private and Commercial Pilot
None specified
R2- Single Pilot IFR Operating Problems Determined from Accident
Data Analysis
Research aimed at solving these problems must emphasize low
cost, low volume, low weight equipment, and human factors
considerations. The following are suggested areas of
research.
• Cockpit displays of aircraft position on area mapping
• New types of deicing or anti-icing equipment
• Low/medium frequency receivers which can give on-course
information
• Standardized and human factors designed navigation
instrument displays
• Improved fuel management systems
• Better methods for pilots to safely acquire experience and
increase proficiency
• Better cockpit displays of weather information
4-1
• Improved air-to-ground communications which would reduce
pilot workload
• Improved basic aircraft stability and control
• Low-altitude warning systems
• More effective pilot training methods
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R3- General Aviation IFR Operational Problem
Table 5-1 is matrix of the operational problems vs the
candidate solutions. The letters in the chart (A thru
represent research tasks that are found in table 5-2.
p)
Table 5.1 Recommended Research Areas
OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS i
PILOT FACTORS
IFR Training Inadequacies
lligh Workload in Critical Flight Phases
High Workload in High Density Environments
Future Growth Rate of High Density Areas
Potential Workload Impacts of New ATC Features
Growing Vehicle Control Complexity
MISSION RELIABILITY AND EFFICIENCY
Flight Planning/Information Availability
High Delays in Dense Terminal Areas
Limits to ATC Arrival Time Control
- Controller Workload Limits to Capacity
Delays in Traversing Dense Areas
Lengthy Delays/Diversions in IMC
Limited Availability of Landing Aids
Routing Inefficiencies
Enroute Weather Avoidance Delays
Low Density Area Delays Due to Lack of Tower
SAFETY
Maintaining Required Separation
Weather Related Accidents
Airborne Alert Environment Complexity
Final Approach Accidents
CONMUN[CATIONS
Communications Channel Congestion
Communication Errors, Omissions and Dropouts
Lack of Tower or Off-iiours Services
Access to Evolving Ground Data Bases
and Operational
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R3- Continued
Table 5.2 Summary of Research Tools
RESEARCH TASK RESEARCH TOOL
A_ALYSIS FLIGHT TEST
A) INTEGRATED CONFIGURATION CONTROL/
DISPLAYS
COCKPIT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
AND HUMAN FACTORS
PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS AND
TECHNOLOGY ALTERNATIVES
B) ALERT SYSTEM [NSTRUI_NTATION/DISPLAY
FACTORS
C) RESOLVING CONFLICTING DATA SOURCES
D) TSD PILOT/CONTROLLER TASKS
E) TSD INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS/PILOT
WORKLOAD
F) REMOTE WEATHER/TSD EVALUATION
ENROUTE/TERMINAL CAPACITY IMPACT
PILOT WORKLOAD IMPACT
G) WEATHER DISPLAY/TSD DATA LINK
REQUIREMENTS
H) COMM. DATA LINK IMPACT
I) REMOTE TOWERED AIRPORT COMM. REQUIRE-
MENTS
J) LOW COST PRECISION APPROACH AIDS
K) EXTERNAL STIMULUS APPROACH MONITOR
L) AREA COVERAGE NON-PRECISION APPROACH
REQUIREMENTS
M) HEAD-UP DISPLAYS
DESIGN AND TECHNOLOGY REQUIREMENTS
PILOT PERFORMANCE/WORKLOAD
N) PILOT TRAINING REQUIREMENTS
SYLLABUS/PROFICIENCY FOR HIGH
DENSITY/ATC
TRAINING REQUIREMENTS OF NEW
PROCEDURES/AVIONICS
O) REDEFINITION OF COCKPIT/ATC PROCEDURES
P) ROUTE STRUCTURE EFFICIENCY
sIrIULATION
COCKPIT ATC
X
X
x
Z
X
X
X X
X X
X
X
X
×
x
× X
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R4- Analysis of General Aviation Single Pilot IFR Incident Data
Obtained from the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System
The data in this report were obtained from the ASRS incident
data base and were used to define problems and, hence,
significant areas for research in the general aviation SPIFR
environment. Five general problem areas were identified from
the data: (i) Controller judgment and response problems, (2)
Pilot judgment and response problems, (3) ATC intrafacility
and interfacility conflicts, (4) ATC and pilot communication
problems, and (5) IFR-VFR conflicts. Several elements were
determined for each of these problem areas, and the
compilation of these areas and elements can be used to define
specific research programs. The relative severity and,
hence, the significance of each problem area, is defined and
can be used as a reference for determining appropriate SPIFR
research efforts. (See tables below)
TABLE II. - RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PROBLEM AREAS
AND ENABLING FACTOR GROUP
Problem Area
Controller judgment and
response problems
Pilot judgment and response
problems
ATC intrafacility and
interfacility conflicts
ATC and pilot communication
problems
IFR-VFR conflicts
Directly
Related
56
30
8
5
0
Factors Cited
Indirectly
Related
8
0
56
86
38
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R4- Continued
TABLE III. - RELATIONSHIP BETWEENPROBLEMAREAS
AND ASSOCIATED FACTORGROUP
Problem Area Factors Cited
Controller judgment and
response problems
Pilot judgment and response
problems
ATC intrafacility and
interfacility conflicts
ATC and pilot communication
problems
IFR-VFR conflicts
Directly
Related
34
8
16
9
15
Indirectly
Related
32
16
49
42
24
R5- Operational Problems Experienced by Single Pilots
Instrument Meteorological Conditions
in
None specified
R6- Study to Determine the Operational Profile of the General
Aviation Single Pilot
Recommended research based upon the results of the GA SPIFR
survey falls into three categories:
•
•
Broad areas of research indicated by the problems which
the GA SPIFR reports he is experiencing.
Further, more detailed analysis of the GA SPIFR survey
data.
• Search for "unique" solutions to specific GA SPIFR
problems•
Broad Areas of Research
The Problems Identification section provide information from
which the following broad areas of potential GA SPIFR research
were deduced•
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R6- Continued
Workload
- Optimize wherever feasible
Pilot Judgment and Decision Making
- Improve pilot's ability to plan ahead
- Improve pilot's ability to more accurately assess his own
capabilities and limitations
Instrument Approaches
- Revise ATC procedures to minimize pilot workload
Weather Information
- Improve availability, reliability, timeliness (especially
with respect to icing and thunderstorms)
Cockpit Environment
- Better lighting
- Better noise protection
Communications
- Minimize communications workload
Further Detailed Analysis
Further detailed analysis of the survey data can provide
additional insight into the nature of the GA SPIFR and his
operational problems in the following ways:
• Providing answers to specific questions about the GA
SPIFR, as was illustrated in the section on Selected
Data Analysis Examples.
. Allowing a further test of the hypothesis that the
operational problems experienced by the GA SPIFR are
independent of experience.
o Determining whether a change in design, training,
regulation, or procedures, or a combination thereof,
is the most appropriate solution to a particular
problem or class of problems.
It is suggested that an analysis of the response codes to
Questions 3 through 7, 9, 10, and 13 through 22 be performed
to aggregate them into a fewer number. The aggregation
scheme used should combine response codes having similar
characteristics, thereby permitting more meaningful detailed
analysis. Care should be exercised during the aggregation
process so that useful detail is not lost.
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As a next step in further detailed analysis, it is suggested
that cross tabulations (or matrices) be developed for the
responses to Questions 3 through 7, 9, 10, 13 through 22, 28
and 29 and the following variables:
Pilot Certification (private, commercial, ATP) (Q. 33)
Type of Airplane (Q. i)
Level of Avionics (minimum, medium, maximum) (Q. 2)
Autopilot vs. No Autopilot (Q. 2)
No Autopilot (copilot, no copilot) (Q. 2, Q. 26)
Recent experience with SPIFR (high, medium, low) (Q. 32,
Q. 37)
Type of Flying (Q. 34)
Based upon the insights gained in the cross tabulations,
a multi-level set of GA SPIFR operational profiles could then
be developed and run against the same set of questions as the
above variables. As an example, the following set of pro files
could be researched in order to determine if there are problems
_eculiar to particular profile:
Operational Profile Level
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6
Pilot certification ATP ATP COM COM PVT PVT
Airplane TBP MEP MEP SEP MEP SEP
Avionics MAX MED MAX MED MED MIN
Autopilot YES YES YES NO YES NO
Copilot YES NO YES NO NO NO
Recency of SPIFR HI MED HI MED MED LOW
Type of Flying CORP BUS CORP BUS BUS PER
or or
ATX ATX
An analysis of the confidence level in the responses to each
question could probably be performed. This analysis would
reveal questions which were often not answered, or were to
sensitive or non-relevant to the respondent. As a variation of
this analysis, certain respondents could be removed from the GA
SPIFR data set (N = 1619) because they did not answer a
sufficient number of questions, perhaps leaving a more
meaningful data set for analysis.
Finally, Question 7 appears to have a high potential for
assigning priorities to desirable changes in the GA SPIFR
operation. Aggregated responses to this question, in
particular, should be examined in relation to other findings
developed as a result of a more detailed analysis of the GA
SPIFR survey data.
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Search for "Unique" Solutions
There is an intuitive feeling among certain researchers that
the GA SPIFR survey data should contain truly novel and
effective suggestions provided by the respondents as solutions
to certain GA SPIFR problems. An Analysis of the most
frequently reported problem/solution codes for Questions 13
through 21 suggests that there are no revelations in the data,
as far as the researcher experienced in this area is concerned.
If there are unique solutions in the data, then they are well
hidden and special analyses will be required to identify them.
On the other hand, perhaps the unique solutions are
disguised in common aeronautical terms, and analyst judgment and
insight in interpreting the data is all that is required to
identify them. For example, improving the availability,
reliability and timeliness of weather information has been
identified as an area for further research. An examination of
the most frequently mentioned problem codes for Questions 19 and
20, with the associated solution codes, reveals that a more well
developed PIREP system might, in the GA SPIFR's view, reduce the
severity of the weather information problem.
In any event, if a search for unique solutions is conducted,
it should be done only for those problems which are deemed to be
significant in the first place. Further, the solutions
suggested are from the viewpoint of a pilot respondent, and the
worth of a suggested solution must be tested against its
feasibility.
R7- Single Pilot IFR Proficiency Analysis
Throughout the report, many subjects are discussed which
lend themselves to further analysis and speculation. The
authors sincerely hope that the efforts represented on these
pages provide seeds for future research which will help reduce
the GA accident rate. Two general areas which are suggested for
closer scrutinization are:
• The impact of simulated instrument time upon the
likelihood of a SPIFR accident• Specifically, one would
very much like to know how much impact reporting
procedures in the NTSB accident briefs effect the
statistics discussed in this report relating to
simulated instrument time. Why are the levels of
simulated instrument time that appear for the SPIFR
pilots in the NTSB data base and the Ohio State survey
as diverse as they are?
• The disparity between day and night SPIFR accident
rates. Out of 5,416 SPIFR accidents from 1964 to 1975
which involved pilot error, only 14 percent occurred at
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R7- Continued
night. Based upon our estimate of night time activity
(12.8 percent of overall activity) derived from the
"General Aviation Pilot and Aircraft Activity Survey",
it appears that SPIFR accident rates are unaffected by
the condition of light while SPIFR approach/landing
phase accident rates are magnified by 10 fold.
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APPENDIX 5
Integration and Comparison
This section disaggregates the finding and conclusion of the
studies and reaggregates the findings into relevant subject areas.
The findings are extracted and presented in this section in the
form in which they appeared in the report. Each item is
referenced to the report (R) the page number (p.) and paragraph or
listing number (Para. - or No. -). This section permits the
reader to readily compare the works from the seven reports as it
pertains to the subject listed. It is also apparent, in some
cases, that the statement by the authors is not a "stand alone" in
that subject area but overlaps other subjects.
A. Rat i n__s_
He is single and multiengine rated. (R. i, p. 4, No, 7)
He received his private pilot certificate in 1970, his instrument
rating in 1973, his commercial certificate in 1974, and his
multiengine rating in 1976. He is not an ATP and is not an
instrument flight instructor. (R. 6, p. 7, No. 33)
Commercial pilots were involved in 56 percent of the 335 SPIFR
accidents, however, the number of accidents per 100,000 private
pilots was three times that of commercial pilots. Forty-six of
the accidents involved professional pilots. (R. 2, p. 19)
Passenger (PAX), Freight (FRT) and Charter (CHR) operations are
typically flown by professional pilots. Of the occurrences in
which the Operation is identified, 9 percent of the SMA set and 50
percent of the SMT set are in these three categories consistent
with the tendency for SMT aircraft to be flown by professional
pilots. (R. 5, p. 6)
Summary: The composite general aviation SPIFR is single and
multiengine rated; has had an instrument rating for
about 8 years and a commercial pilot certificate for 7
years.
B. Trainin_
He received his private and commercial pilot certificates during
the 1960's and his instrument rating since 1965.
(R. i, p. 3, No. 5)
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B. Trainiqg Continued
He received his instrument rating on the basis of completing
required FAA tests and experience. He is not a graduate of an
approved flying school. (R. i, p. 3, No. 6)
He has experienced no difficulties with instrument flight
instruction, procedures and techniques. (R. 6, p. 5, No. 10)
During training for an instrument rating, he visited an air
traffic control tower and an approach/departure control facility.
(R. i, p. 4, No. 13)
His last instrument dual instruction or instrument flying
evaluation ride was last year (1969). (R. i, p. 4, No. 12)
He believes that instrument approach procedures should be included
in his biennial flight review. (R. 6, p. 5, No. 9)
He considers 10 hours of actual instrument time worthwhile during
training for the instrument rating. (R. i, p. 4, No. 14)
He would like to see a requirement for actual instrument
experience made a part of the training and regulations concerning
the certification of new instrument pilots. (R. i, p. 7, No. 41)
IFR Training Inadequacies considerations include:
Pilot Workload (R. 3, p. 4-24, para. 4.2.4); and Approach
and Landing Accidents (R. 3, p. 4-43, para 4.3.9)
It appears that the operational problems being experienced by the
SPIFR may be independent of experience. Although this hypotheses
needs to be tested more thoroughly, it is suggested that if the
hypothesis were found to be valid then remedies to SPIFR
operational problems do not lie in improving SPIFR capabilities
through more training and experience. Rather, the nature of the
SPIFR task should be changed through the redesign of cockpit
systems and ATC procedures in handling the SPIFR. (R. 5, p. 35,
No. 2)
Summary: The SPIFR pilot completed training with no particular
difficulties; would like to see a requirement for actual
instrument experience; and believes instrument approach
procedures should be included in a BFR.
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C. Experience
He has at least 2000 hours total time, with at least 250 hours in
the last twelve months. (R. I, p. 4, No. 8)
In the past twelve months, he has logged 210 hours total time, 190
as pilot in command, less than 20 single pilot actual instrument
and less than 20 simulated instrument in an airplane and in a
ground trainer. He has 2050 hours total time, 1750 pilot in
command, less than 100 single pilot actual instrument, and less
than 100 simulated instrument in an airplane and ground trainer.
(R. 6, p. 7, No. 37)
Over half the SMA pilots who reported their flight time have 2000
hours or more total time, and 50 hours or more in the last 90
days. Similarly, half of the SMT pilots have 4000 hours or more
total time, and over half have 150 hours or more in the last 90
days. (R. 5, p. 7, para. 5)
The pilots in the 335 accidents had an average of 3000 hours total
pilot time. The pilots with less than 300 hours total time had
the highest estimated accident rate and pilots with more than 7000
hours had the lowest. The accident rate for pilots with less than
100 hours of actual instrument time was one-half that of pilots
with more instrument time. The accident rate was lowest for
pilots with less than 25 hours in 90 days and highest for pilots
with more than 200 hours. (R. 2, p. 19, para. 3)
He considers himself at or just below the level of a professional
pilot in aeronautical skill, knowledge, and experience. (R. i,
p. 6, No. 36)
On a scale of one (low) to six (high), he scores his skill and
experience at four, his knowledge at five. (R. 6, p. 7, No. 36)
He considers the six hours of instrument experience within the
preceding 6 calendar months adequate in maintaining a safe level
of instrument proficiency. (R. i, p. 6, No. 35)
He believes that maintaining recency of experience is a problem,
and that the use of more simulators would solve this problem.
(R. 6, p. 5, No. 17)
He is current on instruments, having logged at least 25 hours
instrument in the last twelve months. He has at least 140 hours
total instrument time logged, at least 60 of which are actual
instrument in an airplane. (R. i, p. 4, No. 10)
He has been a pilot in command in actual instrument weather
conditions in the last six months. (R. i, p. 4, No. Ii)
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20 - 24% of his time on instrument flight plans is in actual
instrument conditions. (R. i, p. 5, No. 27)
He has flown in a single engine aircraft in IFR, night VFR, and
night actual IFR conditions. (R. i, p. 6, No. 34)
He flies about once per week, on an IFR flight plan about every
other week. (R. i, p. 4, No. 9)
During the last twelve months, he has most frequently flown for
business (not for hire) or personal reasons. (R. I, p. 4, No. 18)
During the last twelve months, all flying and single pilot IFR
flying was for personal (pleasure) or business (not for hire)
purposes. (R. 6, p. 7, No. 34)
He has most often made ILS app[oaches in the last twelve months.
(R. i, p. 4, No. 17)
He has made an ILS approach in actual instrument conditions during
the last twelve months. (R. i, p. 5, No. 28)
During the last twelve months, the most frequent approach he has
flown was an ILS approach with radar assistance available. (R. 6,
p. 6, No. 25)
During the last 12 months, he has been rerouted or had to hold no
more than twice and has not had to execute a missed approach or
divert to an alternate. (R. i, p. 6, No. 31)
During the last twelve months, he has (a) filed IFR ten times, (b)
had to hold once, (c) not had to execute a missed approach, (d)
been rerouted twice, (e) not had to divert to an alternate, (f)
not had to ask for an altitude change due to icing, (g)" asked for
a route change due to thunderstorms once, (h) not had to declare
an emergency, (i) not requested special handling. (R. 6, p. 7,
No. 32)
During the last twelve months, he flew VFR and on an IFR flight
plan more than four times per month, but in actual IFR conditions
less than once per month. (R. 6, p. 7, No. 35)
SPIFR accident frequency, totals, causes, and trends have
undergone little overall change since the previous study. (R. 7,
p. 13, para. i)
It appears that the operational problems being experienced by the
SPIFR may be independent of experience. Although this hypothesis
needs to be tested more thoroughly, it is suggested that if the
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hypothesis were found to be valid then remedies to SPIFR
operational problems do not lie in improving SPIFR capabilities
through more training and experience. Rather, the nature of the
SPIFR task should be changed through the redesign of cockpit
systems and ATC procedures in handling the SPIFR. (R. 5, p. 35,
No. 2)
A high percentage of SPIFR's are not experiencing any problems
with the various activities, system's, and environments to which
they are exposed during the conduct of a SPIFR flight.
(R. 6, p. 10, No. i)
Based upon this analysis, which reveals the relatively high
commonality of response codes reported between categories of
pilots of different experience levels, it appears that the
operational problems experienced by the SPIFR are independent of
experience. If this hypothesis is valid, then it is suggested
that remedies to SPIFR operational problems do not lie in
improving SPIFR capabilities through more training and experience.
Rather, the nature of the SPIFR task should be changed through the
redesign of cockpit systems and ATC procedures in handling the
SPIFR. (R. 6, p. 55)
He is a 40 year old male. (R. 6, p. 7, No. 38)
Pilot overconfidence due to high instrument time and time in last
90 days. (R. 2, p. 19, para 13, problems)
Low pilot time in aircraft type.
problems)
(R. 2, p. 19, para. 14,
Pilot Characteristics assumed: Instrument Rated; Current
Instrument Proficiency Biennial Flight Review; Experienced in
Instrument Flight Rules, Federal Aviation Regulations; Experienced
in Aircraft Type and Model; and No Co-pilot (R. 3, p. 4-3, para.l)
Commercial pilots were involved in 56 percent of the 335
accidents, however, the number of accidents per 100,000 private
pilots was three times that of commercial pilots. Forty-six of
the accidents involved professional pilots. (R. 2, p. 19, para 2)
Summary: The composite SPIFR pilot has about 2000 hours total
time and 200-250 hours within the previous 12 months;
and has 20-40 hours instrument time in previous 12
months. SPIFR pilot accidents averaged 3000 hours total
pilot time. ILS approaches are most commonly made.
Operational problems may be independent of experience.
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D. Pilot Skill/Proficiency/Decisio_
He considers himself at or just below the level of a professional
pilot in aeronautical skill, knowledge, and experience. (R. i,
p. 6, No. 36)
On a scale of one (low) to six (high) he scores his skill and
experience at 4, his knowledge at 5. (R. 6, p. 7, No. 36)
He subscribes to USE and GS flight information publications, which
are usually current. (R. I, p. 5, No. 19)
He tends to use the published minimums on instrument approaches as
his personal minimums. (R. i, p. 5, No. 21)
He uses the published minimums on instrument approach procedures
as his personal minimums. (R. 6, p. 6, No. 30)
If the weather were reported to be below minimums at his
destination airport, he would not fly the approach. (R. 6, p. 6,
No. 31)
He experiences little or some difficulty, but not much or extreme,
in conducting IFR flights during departure, transition, and
approach phases. (R. i, p. 6, No. 37)
He believes that there are no navigation type problems. (R. 6,
p. 5, No. 15)
He rates ILS, LOC, and VOR approaches as having little difficulty,
ADF approaches as having some difficulty. (R. i, p. 6, No. 32)
Landing phase operations, especially on the final approach
segment. (R. 2, p. 19, para. 6)
He believes the reason for his flying performance deterioration
mentioned in the previous question to be caused by lack of recent
instrument flying experience. (R. i, p. 6, No. 39)
Imprecise IFR navigation. (R. 2, p. 19, para. 9, problems)
Below minimums approaches. (R. 2, p. 19, para 10, problems)
Of the 335 SPIFR accidents there were 96 which occurred while the
pilot was executing an ILS approach and 90 while executing a VOR
approach. In general, the approaches which allowed lower descents
had a higher percentage of accidents at night. (R. 2, p. 18,
para. 4)
Single-pilot pilot error accidents are increasing at a rate of 3.5
accidents per year. This rate is three times the dual-pilot pilot
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error rate. There were 877 single pilot pilot error accidents,
446 of which occurred during the landing phase. Of the 446, there
were 335 on IFR flight plan. (R. 2, p. 18, para. 2)
During the daytime, he would go when light icing, light or
moderate turbulence, heavy rain, scattered or broken
thunderstorms, IFR over mountains, or IFR over water were reported
to exist anywhere enroute. He would not go during the day if
moderate icing, lines of thunderstorms, heavy ground fog or
weather below minimums were reported. At night, he would go when
light or moderate turbulence, scattered thunderstorms, or IFR over
water were reported to exist anywhere enroute. He would not go at
night if any of the other previously mentioned conditions were
reported. (R. 6, p. 6, No. 29)
Improper IFR operations were given as a cause factor in 170 of the
335 SPIFR accidents. In 104 of the improper IFR operations
accidents fog was also a cause/factor and in 68 low ceiling was a
cause/factor. Icing was a cause/factor in 56 accidents and fuel
exhaustion was a cause factor in 14. (R. 2, p. 18, para.3)
Weather data dissemination techniques and pilot understanding.
(R. 2, p. 19, para. ii, problems)
Ten SPIFR Operational Problem Categories have been identified in
the ASRS-2 database. In order of decreasing frequency of
occurrence, they are: Pilot Allegations of Inadequate Service (30
percent), Altitude Deviation (20 percent), Improperly Flown
Approach (15 percent), Heading Deviation (13 percent), Position
Deviation (7 percent), Below Minimums Operations (6 percent),
Loss of Airplane Control (3 percent), Forgot Mandatory Report (3
percent), Fuel Problem (2 percent), and Improper Holding (2
percent). (R. 5, p. 35, No. I)
A pilot's "mind set" was a factor in altitude deviations,
appearing in 68 percent of the occurrences. (R. 5, p. 36, No. 5)
Lack of pilot proficiency is apparent in improperly flown approach
occurrences. In 22 percent of these occurrences, there was
evidence that pilots did not understand when not to execute a
procedure turn. (R. 5, p. 36, No. 6)
The pilot's lack of awareness of his position is an important
factor in position deviation occurrences. (R. 5, p. 36, No. 7)
Takeoff below minimums occurrences were related to the pilot's
cognitive processes. Landing below minimums occurrences probably
could have been prevented by better preflight weather planning and
more conservative decision making by the pilot. (R. 5, p. 36,
No. 8)
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During an instrument approach in actual IFR conditions, he often
encounters the "normal" IFR condition and has little difficulty
with it. He seldom encounters minimum ceiling and/or visibility,
light or moderate icing, light or moderate turbulence, or
nonroutine ATC instructions; when he does, he experiences little
difficulty in handling the situation. He seldom encounters
scattered or broken thunderstorms, or strong winds; when he does,
he has some difficulty in handling the situation. (R. 6, p. 6,
No. 23)
He believes the most common errors made by instrument pilots are:
(i) not knowing personal limitations.
(2) not planning ahead.
(3) allowing skills to deteriorate. (R. i, p. 7, No. 40)
In his opinion, inaccurately assessing and exceeding one's
personal limitations and capabilities is the most common error
made by IFR single pilots. (R. 6, p. 4, No. 3)
Pilot judgment and response problems have primary elements of:
-Excessive/impeding procedural requirements
-Training/proficiency flight infractions
-Limitations due to limited avionics (R. 4, p. 13, para. 2)
ATC and pilot communication problems have primary elements of:
-Misunderstanding of instructions
-Frequency congestion
-Excessive frequency changes
-Excessive/impeding procedural requirements (R. 4, p. 13,
para. 4)
Communications Problems include: Communications Channel
Congestion (R. 3, p. 4-20 and 4-46, para. 4.2.2 and 4.3.1);
Communications Errors, Omissions and Dropouts (R. 3, p. 4-20,
para. 4.2.2); and Access to Evolving Ground Data Base (R. 3,
p. 3-2, para. 3.1 and 3.2)
Fuel mismanagement and inadequate fuel quantity. (R. 2, p. 19,
para. 12, problems)
Summary: The SPIFR pilot considers his/her skill and knowledge at
or just below the professional pilot; uses published
minimums as personal minimums; and has different weather
limitations for day and night. Common errors are not
knowing personal limitations, not planning ahead;
allowing skills to deteriorate. A large number of
single-pilot pilot error accidents are during landing
phase and on an IFR flight plan.
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E. Workload/Distraction
Loss of airplane control generally followed the pilot being
distracted. Even relatively experienced pilots lost airplane
control. (R. 5, p. 36, No. 9)
Depending upon what determinant is used to assess workload,
between one-quarter and three-quarters of the occurrences involved
workload as a causal factor. (R. 5, p. 36, para. i)
Pilot Factors reflecting on operational problems include: High
Workload in Critical Flight Phases (R. 3, p. 4-24; para. 4.2.4);
High Workload in High Density Environments (R. 3, p. 4-24, para.
4.2.4); and Potential Workload Impacts of New ATC Features. (R. 3,
p. 3.2, para. 3.1 and 3.2)
High workload, especially in twin engine aircraft. (R. 2, p. 19,
para. 15, problems)
He almost never receives assistance from someone during an IFR
flight. When he does receive assistance, it is from another
instrument rated pilot who is not a required copilot. (R. i,
p. 6, No. 33)
He seldom has someone assist him in the airplane during a flight
in actual IFR conditions. If he does, the person is a pilot but
does not have an instrument rating, and is not a required copilot.
(R. 6, p. 6, No. 26)
He would often prefer to have someone assist him in the airplane
during flight in actual IFR conditions. (R. 6, p. 6, No. 27)
He believes heading control to be the aspect of flying performance
to deteriorate first as a "normal" IFR flight becomes more
difficult because of IFR conditions. (R.I, p. 6, No. 38)
As a "normal" IFR flight becomes more difficult because of
workload, ATC communications and clearance interpretation is the
aspect of flying performance which is most likely to deteriorate.
He attributes this deterioration to getting too busy with other
tasks, having his attention divided, and not having enough time.
(R. 6, p. 6, No. 22)
Summary: The SPIFR pilot seldom has someone to assist during IFR
flights. Heading control deteriorates first; and ATC
communications and clearance interpretation is most
likely to deteriorate with increased workload.
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F. Weather/Condition of Li hg__t
He will usually file IFR if his destination weather is forecast to
be ceiling 5000 feet or less, visibility 5 miles or less. (R. i,
p. 5, No. 23)
He seldom or never cancels an IFR flight plan upon reaching VFR
conditions after departing an airport in IFR weather. (R. i,
p. 5, No. 24)
He seldom or never files an IFR flight plan before departing on a
flight to be conducted entirely in the daytime in good VFR
conditions. (R. i,, p. 5, No. 25)
He seldom or never files an IFR flight plan in flight.
p. 5, no. 26)
(R. i,
Unforecast and unanticipated weather was the most frequent
unanticipated thing which happened during his last three flights
as an IFR single pilot (R. 6, p. 4, No. 6)
Better, more up to date weather information/briefings is the one
change in the system which would make his IFR single pilot flight
operations easier. (R. 6, p. 4, No. 7)
In obtaining preflight aviation weather information, he almost
always makes a direct call to FSS; often uses TV weather; seldom
visits FSS, seldom uses PATWAS or TWEB; and never uses "AM
Weather" or the newspaper. (R. 6, p. 5, No. ii)
He believes that the reliability of FSS weather information is a
problem, but cannot recommend a solution to the problem. (R. 6,
p. 5, No. 19)
In obtaining inflight aviation weather, he almost always uses
ATIS; often uses direct FSS communication of EFAS; seldom uses
ARTCC or TWEB. (R. 6, p. 5, No. 12)
Weather data dissemination techniques and pilot understanding.
(R. 2, p. 19, para. ii, problems)
He will probably go on an IFR flight if light icing or scattered
thunderstorms are reported anywhere enroute. He probably will not
go if heavy ground fog is reported. (R. I, p. 5, No. 22)
He believes icing to be a weather problem. (R. 6, p. 5, No. 20)
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The one most serious problem which he has encountered in his
experlence as an IFR single pilot has been icing. (R. 6, p. 4,
No. 4)
He handled the problem by obtaining an ATC
different altitude/heading. (R. 6, p. 4, No. 5)
clearance to a
Flight in icing conditions when the aircraft is not deicing or
anti-icing equipped. (R. 2, p. 19, para. 8, problems)
Improper IFR operations were given as a cause/factor in 170 of the
335 SPIFR accidents. In 104 of the improper IFR operations
accidents fog was also a cause/factor and in 68 low ceiling was a
cause/factor. Icing was a cause/factor in 56 accidents and fuel
exhaustion was a cause/factor in 14. (R. 2, p. 18, para. 3)
He has had no need to cancel an IFR flight during the last 12
months. If he has, it was because of weather beyond his
aircraft/equipment capability. (R. i, p. 5, No. 20)
During the last twelve months, when he has had to cancel an IFR
single pilot flight just before planned departure it was because
of weather beyond his personal limitations. (R. 6, p. 6, No. 28)
Of the 335 SPIFR accidents there were 96 which occurred while the
pilot was executing an ILS approach and 90 while executing a VOR
approach. In general, the approaches which allowed lower descents
had a higher percentage of accidents at night. (R. 2, p. 18,
para. 4)
Of the 335 SPIFR accidents there were 96 which occurred while the
pilot was executing an ILS approach and 90 while executing a VOR
approach. In general, the approaches which allowed lower descents
had a higher percentage of accidents at night. (R. 2, p. 18,
para. 5)
There were 152 SPIFR accidents where the aircraft collided wings
level with trees or with the ground. In 63 percent of these the
visibility was one mile or less and in 70 percent it was dark.
(R. 2, p. 18, para. 4)
There were 139 SPIFR accidents which occurred during final
approach. In these cases, the number of accidents doubled for
every mile decrease in visibility. The initial approach phase had
the highest fatality rate with .63 fatal accidents per accident.
There were no fatalities in the leveloff/touchdown or rollout
accidents. (R. 2, p. 18, para. 6)
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There were 240 SPIFR accidents which occurred in fog, 180 in the
dark, and 62 in below minimums weather. Air taxi-passenger and
ferry operations had the highest below minimums accident rates.
(R. 2, p. 18, para. 7)
Below minimums operations. - Seven below minimums operation
occurrences were identified in the SPIFR document set, six
involving SMA and one SMT. A below minimums operation is one in
which the actual weather is lower than the minimums prescribed for
the particular operation and a pilot performs a takeoff (2
occurrences), or lands an airplane (4 occurrences), or must divert
to an alternate (i occurrence). The characteristics of the below
minimums operations are Table 15. (R. 5, p. 24, para. 3)
Low visibility operations at night due to fog and low ceilings.
(R. 2, p. 19, para. 7 problems)
The disparity between day and night SPIFR accident rates. Out of
5,416 SPIFR accidents from 1964 to 1975 which involved pilot
error, only 14 percent occurred at night. Based upon our estimate
of night time activity (12.8 percent of overall activity) derived
from the "General Aviation Pilot and Aircraft Activity Survey", it
appears that SPIFR acident rates are unaffected by the condition
of light while SPIFR approach/landing phase accident rates are
magnified by 10 fold. (R. 7, p. 42)
Problems Areas and Primary Elements include: IFR-VFR conflicts
relating to aircraft proximity at breakout and IFR flight in VFR
and MVFR conditions (R. 4, p. 13, para 5)
Marginal and/or instrument meteorological conditions are presumed
to exist. (R. 3, p. 4.3, para. 3)
The primary role of the FAA is to be the provider of ATC services.
Thus it is in character that the thrust of the FAA's own
modernization program is to improve the efficiency with which such
services are provided, without necessarily concentrating on the
efficiency of the services themselves or the particular needs of
the various classes of operators. The resulting ATC facilities
modernization plans for the most part will result in continued, or
increased, operating costs for GA IFR operators while not
significantly improving the efficiency of their operations.
Potential exceptions include the program for improved weather data
collection and distribution, the ATARS concept, factors improving
airport capacities, and area navigation (which will be implemented
very slowly. (R. 3, p. 6-1, para. 3)
Summary: Improved timely weather reports/briefings are desirable.
Icing is the most serious weather problem. Usually the
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SPIFR pilot files IFR if his destination is forecast to
be ceiling 5000 feet or less and visibility 5 miles or
less. Approaches which allow lower descents; actual
visibility one mile or less; and darkness account for a
large percentage of SPIFR accidents.
G. Air Traffic Control
Ten SPIFR Operational Problem Categories have been identified in
the ASRS-2 database. In order of decreasing frequency of
occurrence, they are: Pilot Allegations of Inadequate Service (30
percent), Altitude Deviation (20 percent), Improperly Flown
Approach (15 percent), Heading Deviation (13 percent), Position
Deviation (7 percent), Below Minimums Operations (6 percent), Loss
of Airplane Control (3 percent), Forgot Mandatory Report (3
percent), Fuel Problem (2 percent), and Improper Holding (2
percent). (R. 5, p. 35, No. i)
The most frequently identified SPIFR Operational Problem was a
pilot's allegation of inadequate service: Three-quarters of such
allegations are deemed reasonable. (R. 5, p. 36, No. 4)
He believes that ATC demands are a problem during instrument
approaches and that better controller awareness about the nature
of the GA SPIFR operation would solve this problem. (R. 6, p. 5,
No. 13)
He believes that too many communications frequency changes are a
problem, and that the system should be designed so as to require
fewer frequency changes. (R. 6, p. 5, No. 21)
Controller judgment and response problems include: excessive/
impeding procedural requirements;training/proficiency/experience
related mistakes; and equipment operational problems.
(R. 4, p. 13, para. I)
ATC intrafacility and interfacility conflicts include: internal
communication problems; hand-off problems; mixed departure and
arrival conflicts; and equipment operational problems. (R. 4, p.
13, para. 3)
ATC and pilot communication problems include: misunderstanding of
instructions; frequency congestion; excessive frequency changes;
and excessive/impeding procedural requirements. (R. 4, p. 13,
para 4)
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He believes that the Federal Aviation Regulations and ATC
procedures are too complex and excessive, and that they should be
simplified. (R. 6, p. 5, No. 16)
Communications operational problems include: Communications
Channel Congestion (R. 3, p. 4-20, 4-46, para. 4.2.2 and 4.3.10;
Communications Errors, Omissions and Dropouts (R. 3, p. 4-20,
para. 4.2.2); Lack of Tower or Off-Hours Services (R. 3, p. 4-18,
4-20, 4-51, 4-34, para 4.2.1, 4.2.2, 4.4.4 & 4.3.5); and Access to
Evolving Ground Data Base (R. 3, p. 3-2, 3-8, para. 3.1 and 3.2)
Summary: SPIFR pilots believe they receive inadequate service
from ATC; that there are too many frequency changes; and
there are too many ATC demands during approaches.
Controller intrafacility and interfacility conflicts may
contribute to the SPIFR operational problem.
H. Safety, Efficiency, Reliabilitz
Safety and Efficiency are present in SPIFR Operational Problem
occurrences. Half of the occurrences involved an act or condition
likely to lead to grave consequences, and one-third involved an
act or condition of ignorant or imprudent deviation from
acceptable procedures. In more than one-third of the occurrences,
the efficiency of IFR flight was affected. (R. 5, p. 35, No. 3)
Mission Reliability and Efficiency Operational Problems include:
Flight Planning/Information Availability (R. 3, p. 4-18, para.
4.2.1); Flight Delays in Dense Terminal Areas (R. 3, p. 4-22,
4-26, 4-28, para. 4.2.3, 4.3.1, 4.3.2); Lengthy Delays/Diversions
in IMC (R. 3, p. 4-33, para. 4.3.3); Limited Availability of
Landing Aids (R. 3, p. 4-34, para. 4.3.4); Routing Inefficiencies
(R. 3, p. 4-36, para. 4.3.6); Enroute Weather Avoidance Delays
(R. 3, p. 4-18, para. 4.2.1); and Low Density Area Delays Due to
Lack of Tower (R. 3, p. 4-22, 4-34, para. 4.2.3 & 4.3.5).
Safety Operational Problems include: Maintaining Required
Separation (R. 3, p. 4-37, para. 4.3.7); Weather-Related Accidents
(R. 3, p. 4-3-9, para. 4.3.8); Growing Airborne Alert Environment
Complexity (R. 3, p. 3.2, para. 3.1 & 3.2) and Final Approach
Accidents (R. 3, p. 4-43, para. 4-3-9).
In light of the above factors, the cost to a GA IFR operator to
improve his mission reliability on his own is very high and the
payoff which results is often insufficient to cover that cost.
Likewise, the cost to an airport operator to provide the ground
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segments of these ATC services is very high utilizing present
technology, and so is typically justified only at airports with
significant air carrier traffic, or very large GA airports. (R.
3, p. 6.2, para. 2)
The tendency of the ATC system to control more and more airspace
as time passes provides improved safety to controlled aircraft but
at a general price of reduced operating efficiency for those
aircraft. Also such trends tend to drive many operators out of
that airspace, actually degrading their safety of operation by
compressing them in a smaller amount of airspace. A potential
solution to this problem is to improve the means by which aircraft
operators can manage their own separation and ATC procedures,
either through air-derived collision avoidance sensors, or through
the display of ground-derived traffic data. (R. 3, p. 6-2,
para. 3)
A comprehensive, well planned attack on the operational problems
of GA IFR operators is needed to provide viable and economical
solutions in order that such a valuable transportation resource
can develop to the benefit of all. This program will include
research which not only addresses the technology development
issues, but the operational procedures issues as well. (R. 3,
p. 6-3, para. i)
The primary role of the FAA is to be the provider of ATC services.
Thus it is in character that the thrust of the FAA's own
modernization program is to improve the efficiency with which such
services are provided, without necessarily concentrating on the
efficiency of the services themselves or the particular needs of
the various classes of operators. The resulting ATC facilities
modernization plans for the most part will result in continued, or
increased, operating costs for GA IFR operators while not
significantly improving the efficiency of their operations.
Potential exceptions include the program for improved weather data
collection and distribution, the ATARS concept, factors improving
airport capacities, and area navigation (which will be implemented
very slowly). (R. 3, p. 6-1, para. 3)
ATC plans for expansions to positive controlled airspace through
reductions in the altitude "floor" and through expansions of the
number of TCA's tends to drive general aviation out of that
airspace, and in particular, drives lower capability IFR operators
away while, possibly, attracting the higher capability IFR
operators (45). Unfortunately for the lower capability GA IFR
operator he is therefore being driven away from the very services
he needs so desperately. (R. 3, p. 6-2, para. I)
5-15
H. Safet[_ Efficienqy, Reliability Continued
Summary: Safety is a concern that weaves its way through all of
the reports. A common goal among agencies and authors
is to improve safety. Efficiency and reliability are
usually inferred. The three concerns of safety,
efficiency and reliability are frequently interdependent
but an improvement in one does not necessarily improve
another.
I. Aircraft
He flies a complex (having retractable gear and controllable
propellor) single or multiengine aircraft, produced since 1965,
having a cruise speed of 150-159 knots, and an approach speed of
100-109 knots. (R. I, p. 3, No. i)
He flies a single engine airplane (four places and over), having
retractable gear and controllable propellor, produced since 1974,
having a cruise speed of 140-149 knots, and an instrument approach
speed of 100-109 knots. (R. 6, p. 4, No. i)
His aircraft has two 360 channel transceivers, two VOR/LOC
receivers, at least one glide slope receiver, ADF and marker
beacon receivers, and a transponder. It is equipped with pitot
heat and an autopilot with at least a roll capability. (R. I,
p. 3, No. 2)
His airplane is equipped with two communications transceivers, two
VOR/LOC receivers, one glide slope receiver, an ADF and a marker
beacon receiver, transponder with altitude encoder, and a DME
receiver. It has an autopilot with roll and heading capability.
It is also equipped with pitot heat and a headset boom microphone.
(R. 6, p. 4, No. 2)
He had much to say about the selection of the aircraft.
p. 3, No. 4)
(R. i,
Given a single engine airplane with one NAV/COM/LOC, and $7,500 he
would purchase the following additional equipment: transponder,
360 or 720 channel transceiver, glideslope receiver, marker beacon
receiver, second VOR/LOC receiver, pilot heat, ADF receiver and an
altitude encoder. (R. 6, p. 4, No. 8)
His aircraft is most likely to be company owned.
No. 3)
(R. i, p. 3,
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I. Aircraft Continued
Aircraft used for business or air transportation functions are
likely to be better equipped. (R. 6, p. 12, No. 4)
More total SPIFR hours are being flown in airplanes appearing with
greater frequency. The more complex the airplane, the greater the
average hours flown. The turbojet sample is too small for
meaningful results. (R. 6, p. 10, No. 2)
The more sophisticated the airplane, the more likely it is to be
used in a business or air transportation for hire function. (R.
6, p. ii, No. 3)
He believes that poor stability is a problem in airplane stability
and control and that the use of an autopilot would solve this
problem. (R. 6, p. 5, No. 18)
He believes that inadequate lighting is a cockpit environment
problem, and that better lighting would solve this problem.
(R. 6, p. 5, No. 14)
Growing vehicle control complexity (R. 3, p. 4-49, para. 4.3.11)
Fifty-eight percent of the SPIFR accidents occurred in twin engine
aircraft whereas an estimated 45 percent of the IFR operations
were conducted in twins. (R. 2, p. 19, para. 4)
Summary: The SPIFR pilot flies a retractable gear, controllable
propellor about 7 years old or newer. The aircraft has
two 360 NAV/COM's with one glide slope receiver, ADF,
marker beacon receiver, transponder, pitot heat, and at
least a simple autopilot.
J. Ai rport
He originates his IFR flights from an airport which has an ILS or
a VOR approach. (R. i, p. 4, No. 16)
He operates IFR most often within a radius of 400 nm of his home
airport. (R. i, p. 5, No. 29)
The one way distance of this longest non-stop IFR flight during
the last 12 months was 500 nm or less. (R. i, p. 6, No. 30)
He flies from one of the higher aviation activity states, having a
high percentage of the nations's more than 13,000 airports and
210,000 general aviation aircraft. (R. 6, p. 6, No. 24)
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Future Traffic Growth Rate in High Density Areas
para. 2.2) (R. 3, p. 2-10,
At present GA IFR operations constitute a major segment of the
U.S. air transportation system. Projections show that in the
future, GA IFR operations will grow to the point where they will
dominate air carrier operations in terms of sheer numbers. This
is true in high density urban areas as well as outlying areas.
The major finding of this study is that the GA IFR operator's
problems are very serious, and will get much worse. (R. 3,
p. 6-1, para. 2)
The primary role of the FAA is to be the provider of ATC services.
Thus it is in character that the thrust of the FAA's own
modernization program is to improve the efficiency with which such
services are provided, without necessarily concentrating on the
efficiency of the services themselves or the particular needs of
the various classes of operators. The resulting ATC facilities
modernization plans for the most part will result in continued, or
increased, operating costs for GA IFR operators while not
significantly improving the efficiency of their operations.
Potential exceptions include the program for improved weather data
collection and distribution, the ATARS concept, factors improving
airport capacities, and area navigation (which will be implemented
very slowly). (R. 3, p. 6-1, para. 3)
Summary: General Aviation IFR is a major segment of the
transportation. Flights generally originate from
airports with an ILS or VOR. The SPIFR pilot most often
operates IFR within 400 miles of home airport.
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